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Plato, Gorgias, and Trickster: 
Seeking Rhetoric's Muse 
Keith Rhodes 
We should never forget that in any psychological discussion 
we are not saying something about the psyche, 
but that the psyche is always speaking about itself. 
C. G. Jung 
Introduction: Trickster's Place in Archetypal Rhetoric 
J ung 's  vision of a "collective unconscious," where metaphorical "archetypes" perform their shadowy dramas on a figurative sub-stage of consciousness, has 
a natural application to the history of ideas. These deep forces, operating simi­
larly in human minds across space, time, and even cultures, can account interest­
ingly well for the persistence of certain modes of human thought-as l iterary 
critics like Northrop Frye have amply demonstrated. Eventually, I hope to argue 
that the Trickster archetype, one of Jung's most puzzling figures, bears a spec ial, 
even integral relationship to the theory and practice of rhetoric. Indeed, as part 
of this argument I mean to claim that, for rhetoric, archetypal analysis is far from 
being just another theoretical lens. Rhetoric, as a consequence of its integral re­
lationship with the Trickster archetype, might be seen as itself an essentially ar­
chetypal practice-one that is most centrally about playing out a specific role in 
our collective psychological drama. Whatever may be the wider range of pos­
sible approaches to composition theory and practice, to take a rhetorical attitude 
toward writing may be nothing more or less than to invoke a Trickster muse. 
Certainly, that may claim too much ;  but let us examine the evidence at length, 
and then come back to this notion. 
First, we must turn our attention to the Trickster itself. Originally, the Trick­
ster archetype received scant direct attention from Jung himself. This can seem 
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strange, since Trickster is a prominent character in one of Jung's most central 
psychic constellations. That is ,  Trickster is to the Shadow as Hero is to the Ego. 
Just as Hero is  the collective figure manifested in the individual Ego, Trickster 
is the collective figure manifested in the individual Shadow (Jacobi ,  1 973,  
pp.  1 09- 1 1 5 ;  Jung, 1 980, p. 262). One reason Trickster can escape attention, of 
course, is that it collects together material that the contemporary psyche tries to 
put behind i t .  Trickster is the dark cloud made of everything bestial and 
unconscious that literate, Heroic humanity struggles to leave behind. Historical 
and soc ial forces have generated the S elf  as a more humane and fully differenti­
ated state of psychic being. The more primal material that collects i nto Trickster 
thus retreats from view as the more S elf-ish Hero ri ses to become the most 
prominently  manifested collective archetype. There is danger, though, in 
pretending that the struggle can ever truly end. If the relatively Heroic proj ect of 
Jungian archetypal theorizing itself does not also contain Trickster ' s  continuing 
influence within the psyche, that proj ect  will suffer the usual, dire fate of overly 
proud Heroes who ignore the deeper gods. 
Hence, i t  would be quite literally a tragedy if those who are interested in the 
project of exploring connections between archetypal theories and rhetoric should 
ignore Hero 's older, quieter partner. Indeed, there may be a particular value in 
discussing Trickster within the context of applying archetypes to rhetoric and 
writing. Trickster sets useful problems before the psyche and then offers arcane 
resources by which the psyche may resolve these riddles, helping the Heroic ego 
along the path toward fuller psychic integration. It  may be that, just so, rhetori­
cal theorists inform largely Heroic writing teachers, enabling teachers in  turn to 
empower largely Heroic writers ; and so we also should expect to find Trickster 
prominently involved in the transaction between rhetoricians and those who learn 
from them. 
If I come not to bury Trickster, though, neither do I come, exactly, to praise 
such a figure. It  would be a grossly mistaken use of Jungian theory to attempt to 
"liberate" the Shadow or the Trickster, to dream of some impossible unification 
of conscious and unconscious processes. Trickster has a dangerous siren call, 
promising to reveal to us the true life of the body, the legacy of evolutionary 
forces brought to bear upon a primate that was once not yet verbal. But there is 
no real hope of going back across the Rubicon of language to recover the roots of 
an "essential" embodied reality. Nor is there any real hope, postmodernism 
notwithstanding, of freeing the intellect from the body and i ts evolutionary 
inheritance, creating a new Empire of mind. Trickster is impossible to ignore, 
then, but it is  also beyond hope of redemption. To play on my previous cultural 
references, we are "Caesarean," irremedially Heroic Selves, torn from the womb 
of nature by human artifice. As such, we neither can nor should fully inhabit the 
role Trickster offers. 
Thus, to align rhetoricians with Trickster, as I will seek to do, is not 
immediately to call  for a higher valuation of Trickster. Trickster's value l ies not 
so much in what it is in itself as in what it does for Hero. Trickster brings to 
consciousness what Hero, intent on its quest, intentionally forgets: that ultimately 
the conscious ego is not a thing apart from the psychic vastness it seeks to con­
trol. Like a Shakespearean fool, Trickster has a maddening usefulness for those 
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who wiii listen. Trickster deflates hubris and reveals the complicity of  Heroic 
individual action in larger unconscious and transpersonal dramas. Within the vast 
historical movement toward fui iy conscious human literacy, rhetoric has played 
the Fool, being maddeningly useful relative to the more straightforward Heroic 
quest of philosophers and other rationalists. 
These days, though, rhetoricians (and others whose works have been drawn 
into the rhetorical canon) may remain maddening, but their usefulness has faJlen 
into question. As Stephen North ( 1 987) explains, teaching practitioners are largely 
out of touch with the work of rhetorical theorists-and sometimes defiantly so.  
Buried in often slavish conditions, many composition teachers who would value 
theoretical discussions are simply unable to take the time to participate in  them. 
Indeed, even where rhetorical theorists ' views are used, it seems often to be a 
matter of the brute coercion of relatively powerless graduate assistants and 
adjunct instructors by academicaJly empowered theorists who control composi­
tion curriculum and other institutional processes. Further, reviewing scholarship 
in the field of modern rhetoric, i t  becomes quite clear that a rationalist sort of 
Heroism is  at work in the over-ail paradigm of its production. If there are signifi­
cant numbers of rhetoricians who are practicing the Tricksterish arts of being 
witty, troublesome, maddening, or seemingly foolish in service of profundity, 
most are not being published regularly. Instead, theoretical scholarship is almost 
unrelentingly earnest and deferential to authorities, even when extoJiing the 
virtues of "anti-foundationalist" theories. Scholarly camps within rhetoric seem 
to have become monarchies without Fools-a tragedy in the making if seen with 
an archetypal eye. 
Rhetoric seems in dire need of applying Trickster 's  healing attention to its 
own processes, then ;  and as the discipline has intuited, one source of possible 
healing lies in examining its own history. Of particular interest has been the his­
tory of rhetoric in  classical times, when rhetoric shifted its nature quickly and 
permanently. Once simply the practice of effective utterance, rhetoric became, 
especially in  the hands of Aristotle, the practice of shaping utterance-a more 
completely conscious practice. This development in  the history of rhetoric is 
clearly analogous to the generation of ego out of a previously undifferentiated 
psyche in the creation of self-consciousness. The generation of ego in turn con­
verts Trickster into an archetype, a personal psychic replacement for the tribal 
shamans who served Trickster's role in earlier stages of more rudimentary psy­
chic integration (Jung, 1 980, pp. 466-4 72).  Thus, there may be synchronicity at 
work in the history of rhetoric, such that an examination of rhetoric ' s  emergence 
as a conscious practice might illustrate Trickster's dialectical value to rhetoric 
and to writing pedagogy. 
Examining the Origin Myths of Rhetoric 
Rhetoric's roots typically have been rendered rather more as myth than as 
history; and, since these myths are commonly known, I will not "blame" any 
myth on any cited source. The old myth of rhetoric starts with Corax and his 
student Tisias-respectively the first to discover and the first to learn a reliable 
art of speaking effectively-honing their skills in the emergent democracy of 
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Syracuse, in  Sicily. As the story goes, Tisias and his own student, Gorgias, 
made an emissary to Athens on behalf of Syracuse, and Athenians fell in  love 
with the sweet nothings that Gorgias delivered so well. This ushered in the age of 
the "Sophists ,"  a band of g ifted, s i lver- tongued charlatans .  A fter Plato ' s  
withering critique of  these Sophists, Aristotle finally regularized rhetoric by 
establishing it on a sound, ethical, and rationalist base. This myth has had a long 
and stable history, and retains a great deal of currency in our culture-whatever 
its inaccuracies. 
Lately, though, a new myth of rhetoric's  origins has been taking shape. The 
new myth rehabilitates the S ophists, finding in their slipperiness somewhat 
less of artful cynicism and somewhat more of legitimate skepticism. Still ,  if the 
Sophists were the first to find "social constructionism," apparently it was largely 
an accidental accomplishment on their part and came to l i ttle in their hands. As 
proof of this, we find in this new myth that the Sophists were unable to prevail 
over the reactionary efforts of Plato, paving the way for Aristotle to implant his 
rationalistic paradigm into the consciousness of the centuries in  between then 
and now. It is important to point out that Plato and Aristotle, the key figures in  
the old origin myth, remain the key historical figures within the new myth. In 
one sense, this is hardly surprising. Given that we have many hundreds of pages 
of works by Plato and Aristotle and only a few fragments of the works of the 
Sophists, traditionally Heroic scholarly work on the Sophists themselves is 
inherently limited. This is  particularly true within the rational-ideal paradigm 
carried forward unreflectively in  the hierarchical and traditional genre conven­
tions still used by most scholars of the "new myth," who apparently remain 
Aristotelians despite themselves. 
Of course, Plato's reputation has not always come out well in  either myth. 
Indeed, esteem for Plato seems always to be less than absolute. Within the old 
myth, Plato 's  flaws-for instance, his lack of thematic coherence in  works such 
as the Phaedrus and the Protagoras-always required some rationalization. In 
recent times, though, esteem for Plato has become much more problematic. 
Indeed, the project known as the "rehabilitation of the Sophists" could, at least 
by volume of discussion, be cast more readily as the dehabilitation of Plato. At 
best for Plato, William Covino's casting of him as a "wondering star-gazer" 
reduces Plato to simply one of several who have urged a view of "rhetoric and 
writing and reading as play with an expanding horizon" ( 1 988 ,  p. 2 1  ) .  At worst 
for Plato, Jasper Nee! ( 1 988) casts him as the scourge of civilization, a deviously 
successful millennia! politician who redirected the course of history, to our great 
disadvantage, through an intentional abuse of the rhetoric of narrative. Some­
where in  between is  a Derridean view (according to Nee!, at least) of Plato as a 
flawed figure valuable primarily for what a good deconstruction of his work might 
reveal (Nee! , 1 988 ,  pp. 1 40-20 1 ) . What recent critics of Plato share with older, 
gentler treatments, though, is a tendency to write extensively about Plato at the 
expense of writing very much about the Sophists. Even Nee!, who complains 
persuasively that the very worst thing Plato did was to obscure the ideas of the 
Sophists, devotes only a brief final chapter, l ittle more than a post-script, to the 
Sophists ' ideas themselves. 
It seems a rather odd move, this attempt to dehabilitate Plato by featuring 
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his thought in  both the content and title of one's work; and here I am, seeming to 
do the same thing. Perhaps it is time to go beneath these myths to find new ones. 
A Trickster Myth of Rhetoric 
Richard Leo Enos ( 1 993) has carefully verified that Empedocles, the mystic 
Sicilian philosopher, has a serious claim to be the most important source (if not 
the founder itself) of rhetoric as a conscious discipline. Enos demonstrates the 
likelihood that Corax, Tis ias ,  and Gorgias  forwarded an art sprung from 
Empedocles' thoughtful understanding of the meaning and effect of language. As 
the standard myth holds, this art was affected by the need for persuasive arts in 
Syracusean democracy; yet i t  had other sources that were both deeper and more 
conscious. In other words, Gorgias did not merely know the practice of persua­
sion and artful speaking, enhanced by a few handy tricks. Instead, Gorgias is 
likely to have known a fully philosophical and theoretical practice of rhetoric, a 
practice of the sort that earlier mythologies of rhetoric traditionally reserve for 
elucidation by Aristotle. 
Further, Empedocles' own understanding was not an accident of genius or 
inspiration, whatever his own claims. According to Freido Rieken's ( 1 99 1 )  use­
fully compressed exposition, the Hellenic/Ionian world as a whole had partici­
pated actively in  a philosophical movement which had already been through three 
distinct stages of growth by the time Gorgias and Socrates initiated a fourth. This 
highly secular and scientific philosophical tradition opposed itself to the belief 
in animistic gods that, if not genuinely philosophical, was certainly the first 
step away from a purely physical human existence into the generation of psycho­
logical life. 
In the first genuinely philosophical stage of this psychological process, 
originating in  the Asia Minor port of Miletus in  the seventh century B.C.E. ,  Thales 
and others sought rational explanations for mysterious matters generally attrib­
uted to gods-matters such as, on the one hand, "objective" earthquakes, and, on 
the other, "subjective" passions. This first stage appears to have lasted until about 
the start of the fifth century B.C.E.  In the second stage, much more dispersed but 
thriving most fully in  the southern Italian city of Elea, Parmenides and others 
eventually discovered that pure rationalism founders in irreconcilable dualisms 
like "changeless change." In  the closely following third stage, more pragmatic 
philosophers, including Zeno of Elea and Empedocles, tried to reconcile the in­
sights of rationality with empirical observations. Like the second stage, this third 
stage was widely dispersed. S till, following the leading influence of the second­
stage philosopher Anaxagoras (originally from Asia Minor) over the Athenian 
ruler Pericles, the fourth, Socratic stage of this philosophical movement eventu­
ally became centered in Athens. 
Before this time, Athens seems to have been a backwater of philosophic 
exploration; and, as Enos demonstrates, S icily had been one of philosophy's real 
hot-beds. Interestingly, Democritus, another leading light in the latter part of 
"third stage" philosophy, came from Abdera, in  Thrace. Abdera, of course, was 
the original home of Protagoras, the only real peer of Gorgias in  the first Athe­
nian Sophistic. Thus, contrary to likely assumptions within the earlier myths, 
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Gorgias and possibly even Protagoras-and hence the Sophistic movement-came 
from regions that most likely outstripped Socrates' Athens in the depth of their 
philosophical traditions. 
Meanwhile, as Enos most centrally demonstrates, running through all of 
this history, influencing both Athens and Sicily, was the hypnagogic tradition of 
the Homeric rhapsodes .  Plato asserts in  his Ion that the rhapsodic tradition was 
one of "mere" divine inspiration, and not a genuine art ( 1 9 6 1 ,  pp. 2 1 6-228) .  
Importantly, we can suspect that  Gorgias would differ. The dispute between 
Socrates and Gorgias most likely was not one between philosophy and rhetoric 
but one between differing attitudes toward the place of the irrational in a study of 
language. Socrates, harking back to deistic and rationalistic thinking that the 
philosophic tradition had left behind in earlier, non-Athenian stages, appears to 
have seen language as a mere device, used at its best in service of either gods or 
abstract rationality. Gorgias, following Empedocles, most likely saw l anguage as 
a fully human phenomenon always combining irrational and rational components, 
either component being a legitimate subject of practical inquiry. In other words, 
the apparent dispute between Socrates and Gorgias, reading both with and against 
Plato here, may have been between a naive, naturalistic philosophy and a more 
mature, rhetoricized philosophy. 
To further elucidate this important difference, I need to add a prominent and 
well-known historical element that Enos rather curiously omits from his review: 
the interplay of shamanism with the philosophy of the time, and particularly with 
the philosophy of Empedocles. We should pause to recall, first, that Trickster's 
advent and the fall of shamanism are necessary complements in  Jung's theories. 
Shamanic cultures still have their external Tricksters; only post-shamanic minds 
need the internalized archetypal entity as a regular part of their internal narra­
tives. Further, the internalization of the Trickster archetype and the demise of 
shamans were an integral part of this important transitional time in the history of 
the West. Empedocles was still quite heavily influenced by shamanic ideas and 
practices (Dodds, 1 95 1 ,  pp. 1 45-147) ,  an influence that makes sense within a 
Jungian framework. That is ,  as the psyche began to disassociate itself from the 
body, at first i t  fell to a god-like but tangible figure, the shaman, to represent the 
repressed body to consc iousness. By the time of Empedocles, tangibility and 
divinity had become partially detached, with Empedocles only vaguely indicat­
ing his possible divinity and claiming mostly to have access to a Muse who could 
tell divine truths (Freeman, 1 97 1 ,  p.  5 1 ) .  
Gorgias and Socrates seem to be at last the bearers of differentiated psyches, 
individuals who claim most of their creative powers for themselves as those natural 
to a mortal being. This is the beginning of the sort of psyche in which the 
Trickster archetype could at last manifest itself as the sort of generative muse 
moderns would be willing to credit as a psychological phenomenon. While 
Socrates and Gorgias made use of this same phenomenon, there might be a highly 
significant difference between their visions of its nature. The famous charioteer 
metaphor from the Phaedrus exquisitely captures the Socratic attitude toward 
Trickster, the shadow, and the body. Al l  three are clearly represented by 
the unruly black horse, the one that seeks to bring the chariot to the ground. 
The Heroic white horse seeks, as Heroes will ,  to escape the earth, to fly to the 
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ethereal heavens. To Plato 's  Socrates, the answer seems simple: whip the black 
horse into submission so that the chariot might soar. To give Socrates his due, of 
course, he does not advise getting rid of the black horse, and ultimately his 
metaphor must be seen as proposing a version of dialectic. Further, certainly 
neither Socrates nor Gorgias can be held to the standard of having a conscious 
understanding of the archetypal implications of their work. S till ,  Gorgias can be 
seen as providing a more practical alternative: the alternative of accepting the 
maddening usefulness of Trickster in  helping the ego toward a fuller integration 
of all of its possibilities. 
Gorgias is  notorious for two works which, I would contend, are misinter­
preted unless seen as attempts to be maddeningly useful in  Tricksterish fashion. 
In the "Encomium of Helen," Gorgias reveals the troubling incommensurability 
between the concepts of fate and blame: if gods and fate rule humanity, Helen of 
Troy can hardly be blamed for doing as the gods required and thereby launching 
the Trojan War. Of course, readers of a rationalist bent could conclude that 
Gorgias actually meant to be understood referentially, as inferring that morality 
is relative and that blame was thus never possible for any human. The argument 
can just as easily be seen, though, as an indirect attack on the idea of fate, a 
demonstration that the ordinary conception of fate leads to intolerable ethical 
contradictions. 
The other of Gorgias' notorious works, reputedly titled "On Nature," has not 
been preserved in its original (Freeman, 1 97 1 ,  pp. 1 27- 1 29), but has survived in 
part because i ts  thesis is so memorably outrageous. Gorgias is  credited with a 
proof that, i n  descending order, either nothing exists, or, if anything does exist, i t  
cannot be comprehended, or, if anything can be comprehended, i t  cannot be 
communicated (Freeman, 1 97 1 ,  pp. 1 28- 1 29). Again, one who looks only at ref­
erential meanings might conclude that Gorgias meant to be profoundly relativis­
tic. Two other quotes from the relics of Gorgias' productions give us a clue that 
something very different was at issue, however. First, Gorgias, not Aristotle, seems 
to have originated the concept that "One must destroy one's adversaries' serious­
ness with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness" (Freeman, 1 97 1 ,  p.  1 38) .  
Second, Gorgias contradicts his "nothing exists" conclusion, at least  partially, 
when he remarks that "Being is  unrecognizable without seeming, and seeming is 
weak unless i t  succeeds in being" (Freeman, 1 97 1 ,  p.  1 39). The first quotation 
alone might continue to support a view of Gorgias as a nihilist, someone who 
aimed only at reversal, contradiction, and making the worse case the better. The 
second, however, opens up another possibility that, paradoxically, destabilizes 
attempts to cast Gorgias as merely a relativist. 
If one reconsiders Gorgias as someone who knew what he was doing all along, 
then the idea of being and seeming having a dynamic relationship i n  the 
construction of reality becomes the most likely candidate for being a genuinely 
referential comment. After all ,  despite what he said elsewhere, Gorgias did 
continue his attempts to communicate and did prize material aspects of exist­
ence. The idea of laughing at the seriousness of one's adversaries, in this light, 
becomes the key to interpreting the playfulness of seeming to attack blame while 
actually undercutting the theology of fate, or of seeming to communicate the 
idea that ideas cannot be communicated. In other words, Gorgias was not being 
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Heroically referential ,  nor was he being merely contrarian;  he was being 
maddeningly useful, following the Tricksterish way with a purity all  the more 
astonishing for being without reference to Jung's legitimating theories. 
This i nterpretation of Gorgias' works makes even more sense when Gorgias 
is seen as informed by trends in the philosophical tradition in which he clearly 
belongs. The idea that, rationally, "nothing exists" was not news to Empedocles, 
much less to any of his students. That i t  may have been news to most Athenians 
creates the context in  which Gorgias' supposed proof becomes a spoof, a satirical 
riff on provi ncial Athenian attitudes toward reference and objectivity. Even 
before Gorgias there was an interesting proto-Trickster, Zeno of Elea, who did 
much the same thing within the community of Hellenic/Ionian philosophers . 
Zeno-a contemporary of Empedocles who worked even more closely with their 
common teacher, the skeptical empiricist Parmen ides-specialized in creating 
paradoxes that revealed the lack of "seeming" value in rationalist accounts of 
"being."  In the most famous of these, it is  "demonstrated" that, in  a race between 
Achilles and a turtle, the speedy Achilles will lose if he starts later. That is, 
logically, Achilles will only be able to make up half the distance, then half of 
the remainder, then half again, and so on forever; he will never catch the turtle 
because, logically, he cannot escape from eternal regression (Salmon, 1 97 1 ,  
pp. 8-9).  Given such obvious ribaldry (however serious its purposes) within 
Gorgias's philosophical tradition, i t  may be absurd in the extreme to read Gorgias 
referentially. 
What, then, could Gorgias have been after? Perhaps one more quote from 
the scant record of Gorgias' words holds the final key : "Tragedy, by means of 
legends and emotions, creates a deception in which the deceiver is more honest 
than the non-deceiver, and the deceived is  wi ser  than the non-deceived" 
(Freeman, 1 97 1 ,  p .  1 38) .  This attitude could certainly apply as well to orations 
that were quite intentionally something other than they seemed to be-that were, 
then, essentially dramatic and performative. In that light, Gorgias goes beyond 
being merely ironic-intending, for instance, merely to produce the belief that 
fate is  bad by pretending to excoriate blame in the "Encomium of Helen ."  
Ins tead, Gorgias may well  have been  intending something more radical ,  
something like a dramatic deception that leaves those who enter into full psychic 
participation with i t  wiser at some inarticulate and irrational level of being. After 
all, this is what could come of musing with an archetype like Trickster, the defier 
of pure mind, the bringer to earth, the harbinger of primeval processes still at 
work beneath the appearance of rational transcendence. 
Plato's Place in a Trickster Myth of Rhetoric 
Despite Gorgias' claim to a more complete respect, Plato 's  continuing 
centrality in  rhetorical discussions may well have more merit than the heroes of 
the new myth want to grant (even though their actions still  grant it) .  That is ,  
Plato 's openly Tricksterish craft may be more important than his rather more 
Heroic referential content. The instability of Plato's referential meaning, of course, 
is old news. Still, it seems impossible to choose among, for instance, Derrida's 
(supposedly) earnest but deluded Plato, Covino's starry-eyed and playful Plato, 
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or Neel 's masterful and dastardly Plato. For a failure, Plato certainly has been 
difficult to top;  for a wonderer, Plato certainly is  heavy-handed; for a schemer, 
Plato certainly does seem transparent. I would like to propose something informed 
by all of these readings that renders choice among them unnecessary : Plato had 
learned from all of his predecessors how to use the Trickster muse of rhetoric, a 
matter which renders the issue of his personal "intent" not merely problematic, 
but essentially unfathomable-and by design. 
I find two clues in Plato 's work to be extremely compelling in  this regard. 
First, in his Ion, Plato demonstrates his belief that art is, at its best, a "divine" 
inspiration, one that necessarily comes from extra-human sources. In that work, 
(harking back here to Enos' tracing of the rhapsodic roots of Gorgian rhetoric) ,  
Plato persuades Ion,  a rhapsode, that his  artistry must  come from inspiration rather 
than technique. After all, Ion clearly does not possess the encyclopedic knowl­
edge that would be necessary to generate his ability on the basis of articulable 
technique. Certainly, we all know examples of artists for whom this is  true­
even if now we have other explanations of the transpersonal agencies that 
manifest themselves in spectacularly imaginative artistry. Even more to the point, 
though, is Socrates' readiness to surrender to his daemon for his own creative 
bursts of rhetorical art, nowhere more emphatically than in  the Phaedrus, the 
most central and penetrating of Plato's dialogues on rhetoric. Indeed, in  the 
Phaedrus, the third and final speech, the supposed pinnacle of truest rhetorical 
art, is cast as entirely the creation of Socrates' daemon. Even if i t  is  possible to 
believe that Plato wanted us to see Socrates as being playful in  making this claim, 
it is also possible to believe that Plato, Socrates' student, knew full well the value 
of musing as a path toward the finest persuasive art. 
Still, I must agree with the pervasive judgment that Plato was flawed, even 
if the instability of the explanations of Plato' s  flaws should make us all wary. 
Perhaps Plato was prevented from gaining ful l  mastery of this process of 
musement by his seeming view that musement came from independent gods rather 
than from the psyche of an ordinary, mortal language-user. On the other hand, 
given his prolific and wonderfully "deceptive" (in Gorgias' sense of deceiving us 
toward wisdom) theatrical art (for what else are Plato' s  dialogues but theater?), 
perhaps i t  is  necessary to give Plato more credit .  Whatever may have been 
Socrates' limitations in  regard to musement, we have evidence in the artistry of 
Plato 's dialogues themselves that Plato out-mused his teacher. Indeed, even con­
sidering the limitations in the available evidence, perhaps Plato transcended all 
of his teachers, including Gorgias. Perhaps by virtue of being there on the scene 
at exactly the most propitious, fresh moment, Plato simply nailed the art of 
musing with Trickster like nobody else ever has. If that were true, nobody would 
ever be able to say for sure what had happened in Plato's work, but it would be 
hard to escape its maddeningly useful effects. That certainly does seem to have 
been Plato' s  legacy. 
Something even more significant may emerge in Plato's  work, explaining 
more understandably why even Plato 's most astute critics spend so much time 
considering his work. Empedocles and then Gorgias may be said to be true rheto­
rician-philosophers, but Plato could mark the point zero from which primarily 
Heroic philosophy and primarily Tricksterish rhetoric qiverge, as they must, into 
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an archetypal dialectic. Plato may mark this separation because he introduces 
a third idea capable of interpreting rhetoric and philosophy together, hence 
permitting them to be distinguished from each other. Interpreting philosophy and 
rhetoric together is the work of psychology, of being neither Tricksterish nor 
Heroic but interpreting both together dialectically. Plato 's millennia! power over 
the entire scene of relations between rhetoric and philosophy may arise precisely 
because he was neither philosopher nor rhetorician,  but primarily the first 
psychologist. 
Still, I see no sign that Plato knew what he was doing sufficiently well to 
articulate to himself the nature of this superior, psychological vantage.  His er­
rors remain as glaring as his potency. Further, i t  seems fairly plain that rhetoric 
continued to be, at its best, Tricksterish in the Gorgian sense rather than 
psychological in  this potentially Platonic sense. Covino ( 1 988)  may under-esti­
mate the uniqueness of Plato, then, but the Tricksterish perspective supports his 
contention that Aristotle, Cicero, Montaigne, Vico, and Hume continue what I 
have called the Gorgian style of Tricksterish discourse, the art of intending read­
ers to experience something other and more than the mere reproduction of refer­
ential meaning. I do not need to assert that Tricksterism was the "intent" of these 
and other rhetoricians, though. Rather, by entering into a discourse which was by 
nature and tradition closely allied to the role of Trickster, these most penetrating 
and relentless pursuers of rhetorical wisdom became subject, at least in  part, to 
rhetoric's  muse and its collectively unconscious agenda. If few of these rhetori­
cians were as fully psychological (and hence fully dialectical) as Plato, neither 
could any rhetorician who wrote after Plato be entirely without a psychologized 
perspective-even if the perspective came from a point beneath consciousness. 
In recent times, of course, there has been a change in the rhetorical tradition. 
As Covino demonstrates, earnest nineteenth century rhetoricians seem to have 
succeeded in driving Trickster out of acceptable rhetorical discourse. Meanwhile, 
Freud and others opened up the possibility of articulated psychological technique, 
a technique that Jung brought to bear on the very source of musing. Modern 
writers on rhetoric and semiotics, like Derrida, Lacan, Burke, Langer, and Eco, 
are more fully aware of themselves as psychological beings. They have been able 
to move beyond the mere trickery of using non-referential or "irrational" 
language to deceive, and have begun to explore these phenomena and their 
meanings in both referential and performative ways. Recent works more closely 
tied to the community of academic writing teachers have taken advantage of this 
new atmosphere of psychologically informed rhetoric. Writers l ike Stanley Fish 
( 1 980) and Peter Elbow ( 1 973)  have gone beyond mere trickery to open up 
"seriously playful" methods of reading and writing. Perhaps most stunning of all 
from this perspective is the insight of Helene Cixous ( 1 976) in "The Laugh of the 
Medusa" that writing the embodied self could liberate unconscious resources in 
rhetorically powerful ways. 
In sum, i t  may well be that in  this time, precisely now, a new paradigm may 
be opening not only for rhetoric, but for the use of Trickster-and by logical 
extension, for the psyche itself. Meanwhile, rhetorical theory and writing instruc­
tion seem poised at the very edge of this new paradigm, uniquely positioned to 
use it and to begin to articulate it .  
r 
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Trickster, Psychology, and Teaching 
Most applications of archetypal thought to writing instruction tend (even 
without intending) to establish Hero as the muse of "empowered" writers-and 
by extension, the muse of teachers in their efforts to "write" an empowering class­
room experience. Here, I claim instead that Trickster has been the most useful 
muse of rhetoricians ,  of writers about writ ing.  This latter claim, however, 
complicates matters for writing teachers . Surely, writing teachers are also 
rhetoricians, "writers" and speakers about writing who intend to complicate and 
support the efforts of Heroic writers in much the same way that theoretical 
scholars intend to complicate and support the efforts of writing teachers. If the 
writing teacher is both Hero and the supporter of Heroes, the demand upon 
writing teachers to become impossibly wise,  to be timeless and genuinely 
individuated Trickster-Heroes, may be acute . The seeming impossibility of this 
demand lurks within the most prominent conflicts in  composition theory, those 
concerning how consciousness is supposed to interact with the unconscious 
processing of such things as syntax, ideology, reasoning, writing processes, and 
theory itself. As in  writing processes, in teaching processes there is  s imply too 
much for Heroic consciousness to manage if everything is  attempted at once. 
As has been indicated above, writing teachers can take on another role, one 
that mediates between Trickster and Hero : the role of psychologist of the writing 
self. Shoshona Felman ( 1 987) has written with great clarity and understanding 
about the application of Lacan's ideas to this project, and I mean to take nothing 
away from that effort in  suggesting something else. Archetypal thinking also 
enters this scene usefully, offering symbols with which to mediate between the 
complex, invisible vastness of unconsciousness and the Heroic sense of individual 
freedom. Moreover, Jungian psychology dares to approach what the anonymous 
writer we refer to as "Longinus" long ago recognized to be the heart of rhetoric 's  
value: i t s  ability to  generate writing that is  sublime, able to remind readers 
viscerally of their most profound longings. Trickster 's most central role , after 
all, is that of forcing Heroic egos into the conflicts out of which they may emerge 
as what Jungian  analyst  James H i l lman ca l l s ,  wi thout  apology, "souls"  
( 1 977,  pp .  ix-xvi). As Hillman points out, the rhetorical perspective on language 
breaks down all attempts to cast  the human condit ion as systematizable,  
concrete, and mechanical, and so becomes a vital aspect of the even larger 
transpersonal movement of soul-making (pp . 1 42- 1 54). 
This description of rhetoric as a Tricksterish discipline directly and centrally 
involved in issues of both re-embodiment and "soul-making" has an immediate 
aptness when considering figures like Empedocles, Plato, Longinus, Erasmus, 
Vico, or B urke. Still, it would seem to have lost a good deal of applicability 
in the professional lives of academic rhetoricians. Moreover, in  the current 
atmosphere of institutionalized education teachers may fear and resent the risks 
of rhetorical teaching as this analysis suggests it should be, something danger­
ously close to psychotherapy-and a rather aggressively upsetting kind of 
therapy at that. 
Nevertheless,  what other responsible avenue is  available? Simply to ignore 
the Tricksterish aspects of rhetorical learning is to be at cross-purposes with the 
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activity itself. Even a brief review of Jung 's metaphor of the psyche as a whole 
reveals that merely cheering on the Hero is  bound to fail ,  for Trickster will come 
along, bidden or not. Even worse, resorting to postmodern rhetoric's  decidedly 
Tricksterish resources without a fully psychological understanding may well be 
the very model of an unwitting psychic "therapy" of a potentially dangerous sort. 
Bold words-even in hyperbole-for someone who has not yet proposed a 
program, I suppose. There really is not a need for a new program, though, as 
much as there is  a need for better understanding of what existing programs offer. 
That writing is a form of Heroic rationality in need of constant remediation 
from Tricksterish irrationality lies behind nearly every recent advance in the 
teaching of writing,  and i nforms all pract ices that render these advances 
genuinely advantageous. Students who have been fed a steady diet of their errors 
lose the Heroic spirit; students who have been given a steady diet of rational 
prescriptions become pathetically incapable of using irrational means to effec­
tive ends. "Process" techniques like freewriting and loop-writing, on the other 
hand, give the irrational room to enter the process. So we are making some 
progress; and yet at bottom what is needed is  something rather more like the 
thorough devotion of teachers and students to something like Ann Berthoff's 
image of wri t ing as the practice of a ful ly dialectical and psychological  
Imagination. We seem not yet to have had the collective curricular courage or 
rigor to meet Berthoff's call .  Perhaps an understanding of the psychic patterns in  
which we work can encourage us .  
Ultimately, though, the symbol-using mortal body, aware because of i ts  
symbols of both the apparent immortality of ideas and i ts  own inevitable death, 
is not merely a system of cognition, a cultural construct, or an operator of rules.  
It  is a fragile, embodied soul in  need of understanding, and most in  need just 
when i t  is  asked to enter into transactions of consequence with other souls.  There 
is much we already know about what sorts of things these souls can do to write 
better texts, but ultimately there is  no "program" for the larger purpose. We j ust 
pull each other out of the cave, one Self at a time-as Plato knew. Qj 
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